Airport Customs Medical Screening
An area of concern for medtravels and those seeking medical treatment abroad is the real concern that they may be refused entry at their country of destination for medical treatment based on the real concern that they may be carriers of an illness that can be either spread in the destination country , on boarding at various points of travel exchange and exchanges and in addition place other travelers , passengers and indeed aircraft , airport and airline staff at risk.
With the advent of modern travel and communications – especially jet aircraft travel – with its immediacy and ability to criss-cross the globe so rapidly this becomes a real concern and apparent danger.
Take for example the case of on single, solitary person with either infectious T.B. ( tuberculosis ) or even hepatitis. The infectious T.B. patient ( infectious tb being spread by exhaled droplets), can easily infect a great amount of people traveling alongside the aircraft with him or her , and in addition place a great amount of fellow aircraft passengers and crew additionally at risk due to the closed recycled air in the interior of the aircraft during longer and extended flights. Add to this the additions and complications of all the passengers and people exposed to all travelers and staff involved. Its a potential medical nightmare and medical disease treatment fiasco.
For these apparent reasons and concerns medical travelers and med tourists need to be aware that they may be screened pre flight and post flight in aircraft , airport and airport security settings. Screening may involve the use of medical staff , customs staff and may involve the use of thermometers and other medical instruments and diagnostic tools, processes, tests and procedures.
For example:
Several countries plan to introduce non-contact infrared thermometers (NCIT) at international airports in order to detect febrile passengers, thus to delay the introduction of a novel influenza strain. We reviewed the existing studies on fever screening by NCIT to estimate their efficacy under the hypothesis of pandemic influenza. Three Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or dengue fever interventions in airports were excluded because of insufficient information. Six fever screening studies in other gathering areas, mainly hospitals, were included (N= 176 to 72,327 persons; fever prevalence= 1.2% to 16.9%). Sensitivity varied from 4.0% to 89.6%, specificity from 75.4% to 99.6%, positive predictive value (PPV) from 0.9% to 76.0% and negative predictive value (NPV) from 86.1% to 99.7%. When we fixed fever prevalence at 1% in all studies to allow comparisons, the derived PPV varied from 3.5% to 65.4% and NPV was >=99%. The low PPV suggests limited efficacy of NCIT to detect symptomatic passengers at the early stages of a pandemic influenza, when fever prevalence among passengers would be =<1%. External factors can also impair the screening strategy: passengers can hide their symptoms or cross borders before symptoms occur. These limits should be considered when setting up border control measures to delay the pandemic progression.
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